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THE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT IN RESUMA
By

ROBERT EUGENE CUSHMAN*

TyHE Supreme Court of the United States has by no means been
neglected by historical writers. Its influence and its work
have of necessity formed an important part of the substance of our
political and constitutional history. The lives of its great men
loom large in the annals of American biography. And yet of the
Supreme Court as an institution, its origin, the development of its
work, its personnel, its methods, the continuity and growth of its
life as an organ of government, there has been no systematic or
connected chronicle of permanent value. There has been plenty
to read about Marshall or Taney, or about the Dartmouth College
case or the Dred Scott case, but for the history of the Court as a
court one has had to be content with Carson's saccharine eulogies
of the Supreme Court justices' or with the sour-spirited economic
determinism of Gustavus Myers.2 Between these two poles there
was nothing. The completion in 1919 of Mr. Beveridge's Life of
John Marshall showed that a real history of the Supreme Court
was not an impossible achievement; for that admirable work was
not only a biography of Marshall but a history of the Court upon
which for thirty-four years Marshall had sat. And now Mr.
Charles Warren has presented to the historian, the lawyer, and
the layman a systematic, scholarly, and readable account of the
Supreme Court and its work from its origin in 1789 to the year
1918.3

Before proceeding to a consideration of the story which Mr.
Warren has told, a word may be said of the way in which he has
told it. To begin with, he has told it at considerable length; al*Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota.
'The History of the Supreme Court of the United States with Biographies of all the Chief and Associate Justices, by Hampton L. Carson.
This was published in 1891 at the time of the centennial of the federal
judiciary.
2
History of the Supreme Court, by Gustavus Myers (1912). This
was 3written from the socialistic point of view.
The Supreme Court in United States History, by Charles Warren.
Little, Brown, and Company, 1922. Mr. Warren is the author of The
History of the Harvard Law School (three volumes, 1909), and The
History of the American Bar, Colonial and Federal, to 1860 (1911). He
was assistant Attorney General of the United States from 1914 to 1918. He
is now engaged in the practice of law in Washington, D. C.
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though the three large volumes with their sixteen hundred pages
have hardly proved sufficient for the purpose. The detailed narrative of the Court's history, term by term, is brought to a conclusion at the death of Chief Justice Waite in 1888. The thirtyyear period succeeding is sketched in two final chapters which
naturally do not aim to do more than mention some of the more
conspicuous decisions and call attention to some of the recent tendencies in the development of judicial power and construction. It
was inevitable that Mr. Warren should find his task growing more
and more complicated as he reached the middle and later periods in
the history of the Court. The cases become more numerous and
more technical, the arguments of counsel and the opinions of the
judges become briefer and more prosaic, and, the formative period
of our constitutional development being largely passed, the decisions themselves seem less epoch-making than those which the
Court rendered in the days of Marshall or Taney. To regret,
therefore, that the necessary process of selection and compression
has allowed but ten lines of comment upon cases which one would
like to see discussed through ten pages is merely to regret that Mr.
Warren did not write ten volumes instead of three.
The author's method has been that of the careful scholar and
in somewhat lesser degree that of the man of letters. The book
is the product of an appalling amount of careful and detailed research. No source of information apparently. was too remote or
too inaccessible to be consulted. Letters, manuscripts, memoirs,
contemporary newspapers, have all been made to render up their
secrets. By his consistent use of long quotations from these obscure sources, particularly the early newspapers, Mr. Warren has
earned the gratitude of the historian, if not of the casual reader.
And yet in spite of this stylistic liability, consciously incurred for a
worthy purpose, he has written a book which is thoroughly readable and intensely interesting.
It is not the purpose of this paper to enter into an extended
criticism of Mr. Warren's book. It would certainly not be difficult to expatiate at length upon the excellence of its substance and
its craftsmanship; and whatever imperfections it has could, by
sufficient avidity of effort, be exposed. The fact remains that it
is a book of very great importance. The writer has accordingly
set himself the task of introducing it to the readers of the MINNESOTA LAW REviEw in sufficient detail to encourage those to read
it who have the leisure, and to give those who do not enjoy that
luxury at least some idea of its contents.
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In order to do this it will be convenient to devote the first part
of this paper to a very brief resum6 of the Court's history in terms
of the facts, conditions, and episodes upon which Mr. Warren's
historical scholarship has shed new light or shed the light for the
first time. This will be followed in the second part by a summary
of certain broad conclusions respecting the influence, traditions,
personnel, and general repute of the Court, gleaned from the
author's portrayal of its entire history.
I.

A SYNOPSIS

OF SUPREME COURT HISTORY

A. The Pre-MarshallPeriod. From the time of its first session in February, 1790, to the accession of Marshall in 1801, the
Supreme Court remained a very modest and inconspicuous institution. It was obviously feeling its way. It lacked leadership;
it lacked traditions; it lacked work. Three of its members left it to
accept positions in the governments of their respective states. 4
Its most important decision, Chisholm v. Georgia,- was generally
regarded as erroneous and was promptly overruled by constitutional amendment. And yet certain foundations were laid during
this period, and certain events transpired, which deeply influenced
the future development of the Court. Some of these merit brief
comment.
In the first place, it was during this period that the Court established the important principle that judicial opinions would be
expressed only in cases of actual litigation coming before the
Court in the usual manner. As early as 1790 Hamilton had tried
to persuade Jay to have the Supreme Court join with the executive
and legislative branches of the government in protesting against
certain resolutions adopted by the Virginia Legislature denouncing as invalid the proposed congressional legislation for the assumption of state debts. Jay refused to accept Hamilton's suggestion.0 In 1792, however, the trustees of the National Sinking
Fund, comprising Jay himself as Chief Justice, the vice-president, and three cabinet members, asked Jay for, an opinion upon
the construction of the law governing their duties, and Jay wrote
an opinion.7 In July, 1793, came Washington's famous letter to
'Robert H. Harrison was appointed and confirmed in 1789 but preferred to accept the chancellorship of Maryland. Warren, I, 42. John
Rutledge resigned in 1791 to become chief justice of South Carolina.
Warren, I, 56. Jay resigned in 1795 to become governor of New York.
Warren I, 124. Cushing ran for the governorship of Massachusetts in
1794 but was not elected. Warren, I, 275.
5(1793) 2 Dall. (U.S.) 419, 1 L. Ed. 440.
6Warren, I, 52.
7Warren, I, 110, note 1.
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the Court asking its opinion upon twenty-nine questions relating
to international law, neutrality, and treaty construction. Jay,
speaking for the Court, declined to consider the questions on the
ground that such an extra-judicial function was not within the
proper sphere of the Court's power.8 Thus did good judgment
save the Court from the colossal blunder of taking sides gratuitously in one of the bitter partisan controversies of the day. Six
years later, when asked by two circuit court litigants to pass on
the applicability of a state statute to an agreed statement of facts,
the Court said it was unwilling to "take cognizance of any suit or
controversy which was not brought before it by the regular process of law." 9 And yet the Court's idea of what constituted a
moot case can hardly be be called overstrict. In Hylton v.United
0
States,"
the carriage-tax case and the first case in which the Court
passed squarely upon the validity of an act of Congress, it took
jurisdiction of a controversy presented upon an agreed statement
of facts which was false and known to be false (alleging that the
defendant kept one hundred and twenty-five chariots for his personal use and not for hire !) and which was argued by counsel employed for both sides by the government.
It is worth noting in the second place, that during this period
the stage was being set for the firm establishment of the Court's
power of judicial review. The very first case on the docket,
West v. Barnes, would doubtless have raised the question of the
Court's power to invalidate a state statute had it not been dismissed on a technical ground." The federal circuit courts, however, did not escape the issue; and Mr. Warren finds five cases
in which state statutes were declared by those courts to be invalid
as violating the United States constitution or treaties 12 before the
SHamilton had protested against referring the question to the Court.
Washington had decided to do so in deference to Jefferson's desires and
Hamilton
accordingly drafted the questions. Warren, I, 109.
9
Dewhurst v. Coulthard, (1799) 3 Dall. (U.S.) 409, 1 L. Ed. 440. The
question raised was whether the bankruptcy statute of Pennsylvania could
operate to discharge a citizen of the state from obligations owed to a
citizen of New York. This was one of the important questions which the
Supreme Court passed on in Sturgis v. Crowningshield, (1819) 4 Wheat.
(U.S.) 122, 4 L. Ed. 529.
10(1796) 3 Dall. (U.S.) 171, 1 L. Ed. 556. The case was decided by
three of the six justices, Ellsworth, Wilson, and Cushing not participating.
Warren I, 146-149.
11(1791) 2 Dall. (U.S.) 401, 1 L. Ed. 433. The case involved the application of the legal tender law of Rhode Island which had been invalidated by the Rhode Island supreme court in 1786 in the case of Trevett
v. Weeden, 1 Thayer, Cases on Constitutional Law 73.
:12(1796) 3 DalI. (U.S.) 199, 1 L. Ed. 568. The cases in the circuit
courts were as follows: (1) a case in May, 1791, holding void a Connecticut statute as a violation of the treaty of peace; (2) a case in which
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Supreme Court decided the famous case of Ware v. Hylton in
1796. It is very interesting that not one of the states whose legislation was at this time held void by an inferior federal court raised
its voice in protest. Equally interesting is the fact that when in
Hayburn's Case 3 a federal circuit court held an act of Congress
unconstitutional and refused to enforce it, its action was greeted
with enthusiastic approval by the Anti-Federalists, who later became such bitter opponents of judicial authority, but was viewed
with grave concern by the Federalists, who feared the judiciary
was becoming the ally of localism and strict construction.
One is impressed further by the fact that during the ten years
under review the federal circuit courts, upon which, of course,
the Supreme Court justices were sitting, rather overshadowed the
Supreme Court. They were deciding more cases, exercising
broader powers, and incidently stirring up more bitter and widespread opposition to the federal judiciary than was the Supreme
Court itself. It was out on the circuit that the justices delivered
their sometimes indiscreet charges to grand juries, enforced the
detested Alien and Sedition Acts, and assumed jurisdiction
under the doubtful and certainly unpopular doctrine of the existence of a federal common law. 14 There is a touch of irony in the
fact that it was the circuit court duty which they loathed and the
constitutional propriety of which they doubted that won for the Supreme Court judges their unpopularity, and which, through the
belated efforts of Congress to abolish it, made the Court itself the
object of the bitter partisan hostility of Jefferson and his followers.1 5

Justice Iredell invalidated a Georgia statute upon similar grounds in 1792;
(3) a similar decision by Justice Paterson in the circuit court in South
Carolina in 1793; (4) Alexander Champion and Thomas Dickason v.
Silas Casey, not published in the reports, (1792), invalidating a Rhode
Island act as impairing the obligation of contracts; (5) Van Horne's Lessee
v. Dorrance, (1795) 2 Dall. (U.S.) 304, 1 L. Ed. 391, in which Justice
Paterson instructed a federal jury to consider a Pennsylvania statute void.
This last case aroused some Federalist opposition.
In 1799 a statute of Vermont was invalidated as an impairment of the
obligation of contracts. There were other cases in which similar issues
were raised but the statutes were upheld. For all of the foregoing see Warren, I, 65-69, and footnotes.
13(1792) 2 Dall. (U.S.) 409, 1 L. Ed. 436. Warren, I, 70-81.
14In commenting on Chief Justice Ellsworth's decision in United States
v. Williams, (1799) 2 Cranch, (U.S.) 82, note, 2 L. Ed. 214, Wharton, State
Trials, 652, denying to American citizens the right of expatriation on the
ground that no such right existed in common law, Mr. Warren says: "No
decision by any federal judge had ever aroused so great and widespread
resentment."
Warren, I, 159-161.
' 5 The federal Judiciary Act of 1801, one provision of which relieved
the Supreme Court justices of circuit duty, precipitated Jefferson's attack
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B. The Rule of Marshall. For a third of a century John
Marshall's personality and broad judicial statesmanship dominated
the Supreme Court. With telling blows he spiked down the
foundation planks of our constitutional system. He fixed the
Supreme Court in a position of dignity and authority; he established the doctrine of judicial review; he laid down the principles
of nationalism and federal supremacy; he freed interstate commerce from the shackles of state monopoly; and he relentlessly
defended the sanctity of contracts. 6 Space does not permit even
a brief summary of Mr. Warren's valuable treatment of these matters. But a few interesting situations upon which he has shed new
light may be singled out for comment.
We are given, in the first place, a somewhat new political setting for the case of Marbury v. Madison 7 and the doctrine of
judicial review. Contemporary opinion seems to have been neither
surprised nor disturbed to have the Court announce its power to invalidate an act of Congress. Until the acrimonious debates in Congress in 1801 upon the Judicial Repeal Act the Court's right to
exercise that power seems not to have been challenged. The
Republicans themselves had applauded the circuit judges for overriding a congressional act in the Hayburn Case' and had loudly
abused the courts for not invalidating the hated Alien and Sedition
Acts. In this connection Mr. Warren shows that the famous
Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions of 1798 and 1799 asserting
the states' authority to disregard acts of Congress which they
deemed unconstitutional were not in reality denials of the power
of judicial review, as has been sometimes asserted, but were
merely declarations of the right of the states to act in such cases
in the event that the courts had failed to do so. In short, Republican antipathy to the idea of judicial review seems to have
originated from the concrete fear that the Court might declare
unconstitutional the law repealing the obnoxious eleventh-hour
Judiciary Act of 1801. Marshall's opinion in Marbury v. Madison infuriated Jefferson and his followers not because it established the judicial veto over legislation but because Marshall went
out of his way to tell Jefferson that he had no legal right to withhold Marbury's commission. It was because the Court dared thus
on the judiciary. Warren, I, chap. IV: Beveridge, Life of John Marshall,
III, Chap.
I, II.
26For a summary of Marshall's work, see the writer's article, Marshall
and the Constitution, 5 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 1.
17(1803) 1 Cranch (U.S.) 137, 2 L. Ed. 60.
18(1792) 2 Dall. (U.S.) 409, 1 L. Ed. 436.
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to interfere with the executive that the Republican editors and politicians hurried to the attack; and practically the only criticism
against the case on the basis of its doctrine of judicial review appeared in the columns of a federalist newspaper. 9 Mr. Warren
sums this point up in a paragraph which may well be quoted:
"The fact is that the opposition to the judiciary during the
early years of the nineteenth century, found in both the Republican
and Federalist parties, was directed not so much at the possession
of the power of the Court to pass upon the validity of the Acts of
Congress, as at the effect of its exercise in supporting or invalidating some particular measure in which the particular political party
was interested. So far from denying the existence of the power to
pass upon the constitutionality of the detested Sedition Act or of
the obnoxious United States Bank Charter, the Republicans in
1800 and in 1819 complained of the federal Court for its failure
to declare these Acts to be unconstitutional; and prior to 1800 (as
has been shown in a previous chapter) it was the Republicans (or
Anti-Federalists) who had especially championed the right of the
Court to protect the people and the states against the passage of
unconstitutional laws by the legislatures. So, in the same manner,
the Federalists in 1808 assailed the federal courts for failing to
hold the hated Embargo Act unconstitutional. Unquestionably, if
the Court had held either the Sedition Act, the Embargo, or the
Bank Charter unconstitutional, the party opposing those laws
would have warmly applauded its action, and would have been little
concerned over the question of the existence of the power of the
Court. This history of the years succeeding 1800 clearly shows
that, with regard to this judicial function, the political parties
divided not on lines of general theory of government, or of conlocalism, but on lines of
stitutional law, or of nationalism against
20
political, social or economic interest."
In connection with the case of McCulloch v. Maryland21 and its
setting it is worth noting that the doctrine of implied powers and
liberal construction had been clearly enunciated by Marshall as
early as 1804 in the case of United States v. Fisher.22 Furthermore, in 1809 in Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 23 the question
of the right of a state to tax a branch of the Bank of the United
States had been involved. The Court dismissed the case for want
of jurisdiction, holding that to give the federal courts jurisdiction
'9Warren, I, 243-268. Mr. Warren calls attention to the fact that within six months of the decision in Marbury v. Madison the circuit court for

the District of Columbia upon which Marshall sat invalidated an act of

Congress in the case of United States v. Benjamin More. Although published20 widely this decision received no criticism. Warren, I, 255.
Warren, I, 266-267.
21(1819) 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 316, 4 L. Ed. 579.
22(1805) 2 Cranch (U.S) 358, 3 L. Ed. 304.
23(1809)

5 Cranch (U.S.) 61, 3 L. Ed. 38.
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on the ground of diversity of citizenship it must be affirmatively
shown that all stockholders of a corporation are citizens of a state
other than that of the opposing party to a suit. This case had two
important consequences: it kept corporation cases out of the
federal courts for nearly forty years, 24 and it postponed the decision of the issue in McCulloch v. Maryland, respecting state
authority, for nine years. Mr. Warren thinks that if the Court
could have met this issue under the more auspicious circumstances
of 1810 the whole course of our legal history might have been
different. 25
The decision in McCulloch v. Maryland was, of
course, received with a storm of protest by the Republicans. Interestingly enough, the point of bitterest attack seems to have been
the doctrine of implied powers and the failure of the Court to invalidate the act chartering the bank, although there was at the
same time plenty of protest against that portion of the decision
invalidating the taxing act of Maryland, protest emanating particularly from the seven other states which had passed laws designed to exclude the bank or cripple its activities.2 6 It must be
kept in mind that this decision was rendered only a year before the
enactment of the famous Missouri Compromise Act of 1820, and
the slavery issue was already becoming acute.
The southern
leaders viewed with alarm the pronouncement of the broad doctrine of implied powers because they feared that it might serve as
the constitutional basis for congressional interference with
slavery.72
The slave states also viewed with bitter resentment the decision in Gibbons v. Ogden,28 holding the New York steamboat
monopoly an unconstitutional interference with interstate commerce. In most parts of the country the decision was received
with great rejoicing, for, as l'.r. Warren says, "It was the first
24

This doctrine as to the citizenship of corporations was abandoned in
Louisville,
etc., R. v. Letson, (1844) 2 How. (U.S.) 497, 11 L. Ed. 353.
25
1-ad the Court sustained the jurisdiction of the circuit court and
decided the important constitutional questions involved, the course of legal
history would have been radically changed. McCulloch v. Maryland would
have been anticipated by ten years; Congressional power to charter a bank
would have been upheld: the long debates in Congress between 1810 and
1816 over this power would not have occurred; the charter of the old
bank would probably have been renewed; the tremendous difficultie8 in the
financing of the War of 1812 would have been obviated; the feelings of
state jealousy over the denial of the state powers of taxation would have
been less vigorous than they were ten years later, after a series of state
laws26had been set aside by the Court." Warren, I, 392.
These states were Indiana, Illinois, Tennessee, Georgia, North Carolina, 27Kentucky, and Ohio. Warren, I, 505-506.
Warren, II, 2.
28(1824) 9 Wheat. (U.S.) 1, 6 L. Ed. 23.
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great 'trust' decision in this country, and quite naturally met with
popular approval on this account. ' 29 But the South saw that the
doctrines laid down placed in the hands of Congress control over
foreign and interstate slave trade. Nor was this mere speculation.
Eight months before, Mr. Justice Johnson in the circuit court had
held unconstitutional a South Carolina statute forbidding the entrance into the state of free negroes on the ground that the statute
impaired the freedom of commerce.3' The state, violently protesting against outside interference, continued to enforce this law
for over twenty-five years in open defiance of the court's decree.
C. Taney and the Slavery Issue. If the history of the Supreme Court were to be dramatized, practically every one north
of the Mason and Dixon line would unhesitatingly select Chief
Justice Taney for the r6le of villain. So inextricably has history
linked his name with the Dred Scott case that all the rest of his
twenty-eight years on the Bench counts for nothing. Mr. Warren
does valuable service in making evident the high character of
Taney's judicial service in general and by tracing the interesting
history of the slavery issue in the courts.
No justice ever took a seat on the Supreme Court in the face
of more bitter opposition than did Marshall's successor. In January, 1835, Jackson had nominated Taney, his secretary of the
treasury, to the associate justiceship left vacant by the resignation of Mr. Justice Duval. The Senate by a close vote rejected
the nomination. Nearly a year later, after Marshall's death,
Jackson nominated Taney to the chief justiceship. A violent
struggle ensued for over two and a half months, but Taney's appointment finally was confirmed. Deep was the gloom of the
Whigs. Forgetting that the new chief justice had for years shared
with Wirt the leadership of the brilliant bar of Maryland, they
could see in the appointment only a political henchman receiving
his reward; and they predicted the early reversal of the sound
31
constitutional doctrines which Marshall had established.
Marshall's
These gloomy prophesies were never realized.
work was not destroyed. Private rights were not endangered;
and the principles of nationalism, if somewhat modified, were still
29
Warren, II, 76. "For the one and only time in his career on the
Supreme Bench Marshall had pronounced a 'popular' opinion. The press
acclaimed him as the deliverer of the nation from the thralldom to monopoly."30 Beveridge, op. cit., IV, 445.

Warren, II, 84.

31

"Judge Story thinks the Supreme Court is gone, and I think so too"
was Webster's comment. Warren, II, 284, and notes.
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not reversed. Yet the attitude of the Court did change, as was
more or less inevitable; and while those changes did not find favor
in the eyes of Story and Kent, the more impartial student of history at the present time will hardly feel like asserting that they
were changes to be deplored. Mr. Warren compares Taney's
Court with that of Marshall in a paragraph so penetrating in its
analysis and so admirable in its expression as to warrant its quotation in full :32
"There was, however, no real relaxation in the determination
of the Court to uphold the National dignity and sovereignty, in any
case where it was really attacked; and in fact, in the succeeding
years, Chief Justice Taney went even further than Marshall had
been willing to go in extending the jurisdiction of the federal courts
in admiralty and corporation cases and in many other directions.
If any real change in the course of the Court in cases affecting the
National powers can be detected, between the thirty years after
1836 and the years prior, it may be said to amount only to this:
that in doubtful cases, the Court possibly tended to give the benefit
of the doubt to the state more than in Marshall's time, and even
this statement cannot be made without qualification. But Taney
differed from Marshall in one respect very fundamentally, and
this difference was clearly shown in the decisions of the Court.
Marshall's interests were largely in the constitutional aspects of
the cases before him; Taney's were largely economic and social.
Marshall was, as his latest biographer has said, 'the Supreme Conservative'; Taney was a Democrat in the broadest sense, in his beliefs and sympathies. Under Marshall, the 'leading doctrine of constitutional law during the first generation of our national history
was the doctrine of vested rights.' Like his contemporary in
England, Sir Robert Peel, he believed that 'the whole duty of
government is to prevent crime and to preserve contracts.' Under
Taney, however, there took place a rapid development of the doctrine of the police power, 'the right of the state legislature to take
such action as it saw fit, in the furtherance of the security, morality
and general welfare of the community, save only as it was prevented from exercising its discretion by very specific restrictions in the
written constitution.' 'The object and end of all government,'
Taney has said with great emphasis in the Charles.River Bridge
case, 'is to promote the happiness and prosperity of the community by which it is established and it can never be assumed that
the government intended to diminish the power of accomplishing
the end for which it was created... We cannot deal thus with
the rights reserved to the states, and by legal intendments and
mere technical reasoning take away from them any portion of that
power over their own internal police and improvement, which is
so necessary to their well being and prosperity.' It was this
change of emphasis from vested, individual property rights to the
32

Warren, II, 307-310.
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personal rights and welfare of the general community which
characterized Chief Justice Taney's Court. And this change was
but a recognition of the general change in the social and economic
conditions and in the political atmosphere of that period, brought
about by the adoption of universal manhood suffrage, by the revolution in methods of business and industry and in names of transportation, and by the expansion of the Nation and its activities.
The period from 1830 to 1860 was an era of liberal legislationthe emancipation of married women, the abolition of imprisonment
for debt, the treatment of bankruptcy as a misfortune and not a
crime, prison reform, homestead laws, abolition of property and
religious qualifications for the electorate, recognition of labor
unions, liberalizing of rules of evidence, and criminal penalties.
It was but natural that the courts amid such progressive conditions should acquire a new outlook responsive thereto. As has
been well said, at the very moment when the election of Jackson
meant the supremacy of the doctrine of strict construction, there
arrived an era in the national life 'when the demand went forth for
a large government programme: for the public construction of
canals and railroads, for free schools, for laws regulating the professions, for anti-liquor legislation, for universal suffrage.' Taney
came to the Bench with the view that the states must possess the
sovereign and complete power to carry out this programme and to
enact useful legislation for their respective populations.
To
Taney, the paramountcy of national power within the sphere of its
competence was of equal but no greater importance than complete
maintenance of the reserved sovereignty of the states. Neither
must be unduly favored or promoted."
The judicial history of the slavery controversy culminating in
the Dred Scott case3 can only be summarized briefly. It seems
clear, in the first place, that the Supreme Court had early realized
the explosive character of the slavery question and had wherever
possible avoided it. Marshall himself in 1820 had discreetly sidestepped the question of the validity of a Virginia act forbidding
the entrance of free negroes when that issue had arisen in the circuit court in the case of the Brig Wilson."4 As he wrote to Story,
with apparent relish:
"A case has been brought before me in which I might have considered its constitutionality, had I chosen to do so; but it was not
absolutely necessary, and as I am not fond of butting against a
wall in sport, I escaped on the construction of the act."' 5
As we have seen, however, Judge Johnson on the South Carolina circuit had been less fortunate.25 In 1841 practically the same
question, the power of a state to forbid the importation of slaves,
33

Dred Scott v. Sanford, (1857) 19 How. (U.S.) 393, 15 L. Ed. 691.
34(1820)
1 Brock. (U.S.C.C.) 423, Fed. Cas. No. 17,846.
3
5Warren, II, 86.
3GSupra, p. 283.
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came before the Supreme Court in the case of Groves v. Slaughter,37 but a majority of the Court avoided a decision of the constitutional issue by holding the clause of the state constitution in
question not self-executing. Ten years later there was presented
to the Court in the case of Strader v. Graham"8 the precise issue
raised in the Dred Scott case: namely, whether slaves taken from
a slave state to a free state and then back to a slave state remained
slaves or had acquired their freedom. The Court held unanimously that the status of the slaves in question was governed exclusively by the laws of Kentucky, the state to which they had been
returned, and that no federal jurisdiction arose. While there was
some criticism of the Court's decisions on the Fugitive Slave Law,
it is clear that prior to the Dred Scott case the Court had managed
fairly well to keep from getting itself embroiled in the slavery
controversy.
A second important element in the situation stands out. This
is the development of a movement amongst certain of the political
leaders to force the Supreme Court to decide, whether it wished
to or not, the bitterly controverted question of the power of Congress over slavery in the territories. A provision designed to accomplish this formed part of the compromise program of 1850.",
The result of this was most unfortunate. The conservative Whigs
together with the northern and southern Democrats favored the
idea of shifting onto the Court the responsibility of settling the
slavery issue and loudly professed their willingness to abide by
its decision. Even Lincoln was converted to this point of view. 4
The Free-soilers, on the other hand, apparently fearing the outcome, protested vigorously. Convinced, however, that a decision
would ultimately be rendered on the question, they set about systematically to discredit the Court and thus to forestall the influence of any adverse pronouncement it might make. For nearly
nine years the Court was the target of the most malignant vituperation; with the result that by the time the Dred Scott case was actu37(1841) 15 Pet. (U.S.) 449, 10 L. Ed. 800.
38(1851) 10 How. (U.S.) 13, L. Ed. 337.
39
In 1848 Senator Clayton introduced a bill for the admission of Oregon, one clause of which provided for appeals to the Supreme Court upon
questions relating to the title to slaves, or to personal freedom arising on
habeas corpus. The bill passed the Senate but not the House. Warren, II,
482-486. These same provisions, in substance, formed part of the Territorial
Act of 1850 for Utah and New Mexico. See Report of Sen. Committee
on Territories, Jan. 4, 1854. Senate Reports, No. 15, 33 Cong., I Sess. The
text of these provisions is found in Allen Johnson's Readings in American
History (U.S.) 414.
Constitutional
40
Warren, III, 52.
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ally decided the Free-soil party had argued itself back into the
old Jeffersonian-Jacksonian doctrine that a decision of the
Supreme Court could not bind Congress in the exercise of its legislative authority.
The Dred Scott case itself need not be discussed at length. It
was not, as has sometimes been alleged, framed by the slavery interests merely to get a decision on the slavery question. At the
time of argument it attracted much less attention than the case of
Ableman v. Booth, 1 which was also pending. It presented no
new issue, for the facts were practically identical with those in
Straderv. Graham,42 decided in 1851. After the arguments in the
Dred Scott case had been heard the judges agreed not to render an
opinion upon the constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise
Act of 1820, but to hold that, whatever the negro's status had
been while residing in free territory, his present status was determined by the laws of Missouri; and since those laws held him
a slave he could not sue in a federal court. Mr. Justice Nelson
was designated to write the Court's opinion. Thus, again, the
Court would avoid expressing itself squarely on the slavery issue.
it was learned, however, that Justices McLean and Curtis were
writing vigorous dissenting opinions in which they were discussing and upholding the Missouri Compromise Act. The majority,
"forced up to this point by the two dissentients," apparently believing that a judicial decision on this vital question might settle
it forever, determined finally to render an opinion covering the
whole question of slavery in the territories. At this point a curious incident occurred. Mr. Justice Grier still felt that the Court
should avoid the dangerous constitutional question. Accordingly
Mr. Justice Catron wrote to Buchanan, the President-elect, telling him that the Court was going to pass on the validity of the
Missouri Compromise Act and asking him to write to Grier urging upon him the necessity of settling the whole controversy by
a clean-cut decision. This Buchanan did; and on February 23,
1857, Grier replied in a letter telling at length how the Court was
to treat the case, and outlining what "you may safely say in your
inaugural. 14 3 Thus is established, what was long denied, 44 that
41(1858)
21 How.
42
Supra, p. 286.
43
Warren,
III, 17,
44

(U.S.) 506, 16 L. Ed. 169.

note.
"But however Buchanan got his intelligence, his character and that
of Taney are proof that the chief justice did not communicate the import
of his decision to the president-elect." Rhodes, History of the United
States, II, 269.
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the new President had advance knowledge of the Court's decision,
although it is equally clear that the character of the decision was in
no way influenced by Buchanan's own views or political desires.
The actual decision in the Dred Scott case was far less important than what people thought about it and thought about the
Court for rendering it. The case settled nothing, not even the
rights of Dred Scott, who was freed three months later. But it
cost the Court the confidence of the country. Not only had they
blundered, but they had needlessly gone out of their way to blunder. As Professor Corwin has put it:
"The Dred Scott decision cannot be, with accuracy, written
down as usurpation, but it can and must be written down as a
gross abuse of trust by the body which rendered it. The results
from that abuse of trust were, moreover, momentous. During
neither the Civil War nor the period of reconstruction did the
Supreme Court play anything like its due r6le of supervision, with
the result that during the one period the military powers of the
President underwent undue expansion, and during the other the
legislative powers of Congress. The Court itself was conscious of
its weakness, yet notwithstanding its prudent disposition to remain
in the background, at no time since Jefferson's first administration
has its independence been in greater jeopardy than in the decade
between 1860 and 1870. Slow and
laborious was its task of recup45
erating its shattered reputation."
After the Dred Scott case the Republicans and Free-soilers
were in no mood to view with complacence the patently sound decision of the Court in Ableman v.Booth.4" The supreme court of
Wisconsin invalidated the Fugitive Slave Law and sustained the
right of the state to release violators of that law from the custody
of the federal authorities.47 Abolitionists could think only in
terms of abolition. Consistency was thrown to the winds. As war
broke upon the scene we find the state of Wisconsin belligerently
hurling forth from her courts and legislature the same doctrines
of nullification which had brought such wide-spread rebuke upon
the head of South Carolina in 1833; while Chief Justice Taney,
popularly regarded as the arch-apostle of the states rights philosophy, was thundering back in terms of a nationalism which
Marshall himself never exceeded.
45
"The Dred Scott Decision in the Light of Contemporary Legal Doctrine," 17 Amer. Hist. Rev. 52. Mr. Warren comments upon "the gross and
willful perversion of a sentence in the Chief Justice's opinion" to the
effect that "the negro has no right which the white man is bound to respect."
This was not Taney's own view, but his description of the view generally
prevalent
during the eighteenth century. Warren, III, 25.
4
6Supra, p. 287.
471n re Booth, (1854) 3 Wis. 1.
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D. The War and Reconstruction. Six weeks after the outbreak of hostilities in 1861, Chief Justice Taney, sitting in the circuit court, locked horns with President Lincoln in the famous
Merryman case4s over the right of the court to release on habeas
corpus a prisoner in custody of the military authorities. The
President ignored the court's action entirely, and Taney died
three years later firmly believing, as Marshall had believed at his
death nearly thirty years before, that the independent position of
the judiciary was gone forever. 9 Other cases of interest rose
during the war, but they are overshadowed in importance by the
judicial history of Reconstruction. It may be noted that in 1863
the size of the Court was increased to ten. President Lincoln appointed five justices during his tenure of office and was able thus
to reconstruct the Court.50
The decision in the case of Ex parte Milligan,"- in 1866,
marked the opening of a long battle between Congress and the
Court in respect to Reconstruction, The Court unanimously vindicated Taney's position in the Merrynan case, by holding that
the president had no power to institute military trials in time of
war in localities where the civil courts were open. A majority of
the Court went on to say that Congress itself had no authority to
establish military tribunals under such circumstances, an opinion
from which four justices vigorously dissented. 5 ' This decision
came too late to embarrass the conduct of the war, but it came just
in time to serve notice upon Congress that its plans for Reconstruction through the establishment of military government in the
South were in grave danger. 53 The reaction in Congress was
4
8Ex parte Merryman, (1861) Taney (U.S.C.C.) 246, Fed. Cas. No.
9, 487.
49
Marshall's extreme pessimism during his last years is clearly brought
out by Beveridge, op. cit. IV, Chap. X. Mr. Warren calls attention to two
other cases in which the courts defied the military authorities. "Judge
Treat of the United States district court in St. Louis issued a writ of
habeas corpus in the case of Capt. Emmet Macdonald, who had been arrested and imprisoned by General Harvey, on charges of treason, and after
lengthy arguments an order for Macdonald's discharge was issued and
finally complied with by the Army." Warren, III, 91, note. See also In
re Kemp, (1863) 16 Wis. 382, supporting Taney's views in the Merryman
case and holding the president without power to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus. Warren, III, 95, note.
5OLincoln's appointees, however, did not constitute a majority during
Lincoln's own life.
• (1866) 4 Wall. (U.S.) 2, 18 L. Ed. 281.
52
The majority consisted of Justices Field, Davis, Nelson, Grier and
Clifford. Justices Miller, Swayne, Wayne, and Chief Justice Chase dissented3 on the question of congressional power.
6 The justices had aroused the ire of the radical Republicans by refusing to sit in the circuit courts in the Southern states as long as they were
governed by military authority. Chase's refusal to hold court in Virginia
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prompt and furious; and the ruffled feelings of the Republican
majority were by no means soothed by the two decisions rendered
eight months later, Cummings v. Missouri and Ex Parte Garland,54 holding the state and federal test oath provisions to be bills
of attainder and ex post facto laws. Congressional attacks on the
Court now appeared in all the various forms which the enemies of
Marshall had devised forty years before. "5 The Court wisely avoided trouble by holding in Mississippiv. Johnson and in Georgia v.
Stanton56 that they could not enjoin the president or his secretary
of war from enforcing the Reconstruction Acts. But when
shortly thereafter it was clear that the constitutionality of those
acts was to come before the Court in McCardle's Cae,57 the Republicans in Congress, in spite of Democratic taunts that they
were afraid to trust the decision of a court of which President
Lincoln's five appointees now constituted a majority, 5 passed an
act taking away the Court's appellate jurisdiction in habeas corpus
cases, even in cases pending, and thus snatched the constitutional
issue fr6m the very grasp of the Court.59 That tribunal has never
been subjected to more humiliating treatment than that which it received at the hands of the Republican leaders in the late sixties.
prevented the trial of Jefferson Davis for treason. Chase's theory seems to
have been that Davis should be tried before a military tribunal; but he was
obviously reluctant to sit in the case under any circumstances. Warren,
III, 143. See also Salmon P. Chase, by Hart (Amer. Statesmen Series)
352-353.
54(1867) 4 Wall. (U.S.) 277, 18 L. Ed. 366, and (1867) 4 Wall. (U.S.)
333, 18
Ed. 356.
55Warren, III, 16g-176.
56(1867) 4 Wall. (U.S.) 475, 18 L. Ed. 437, and (1867) 6 Wall. (U.S.)
50, 18 L. Ed. 721.
57Ex parte McCardle, (1868) 7 Wall. (U.S.) 506, 19 L. Ed. 264. The
act of Feb. 5, 1867 provided for appeals from federal circuit courts to the
Supreme Court in habeas corpus cases, in "all cases where any person may
be restrained of his or her liberty, in violation of the constitution or of any
treaty or law of the United States." The law had been enacted to aid in
the enforcement of the Reconstruction Acts; it was seized upon in McCardle's case to contest the validity of those acts. Warren, III, 187.
58
The death of Justices Catron and Wayne had reduced the membership of the Court to eight. The size of the Court had been fixed at seven
by act of July 23, 1866 in order to prevent President Johnson from filling
any vacancies thereon. Warren, III, 145.
"9In the case of Ex parte Yerger, (1869) 8 Wall. (U.S.) 85, 19 L. Ed.
332, the Court held that it still had appellate jurisdiction in a habeas corpus
proceeding under the provision of the federal Judiciary Act of 1789, and
it looked as though the issue of the validity of the Reconstruction Acts
would be passed upon. A bill was introduced in the Senate to deprive the
Court of all appellate jurisdiction in cases arising from the Reconstruction
Acts and another bill would have denied the Court the power to invalidate any act of Congress. The Yerger case was compromised and these
bills never came to a vote. Warren, III, 213-219.
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The Court's handling of the Legal Tender Cases, which now
came on for argument, did not tend to strengthen its position in
the public mind. In 1863 the question of the validity of the Legal
Tender Acts had come before the Court in the case of Roosevelt
v. Meyer;60 but that case had been dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Had the question been decided at that time the acts would
almost certainly have been held void by so large a majority of the
Court that no attempt would have been made to have the question
reopened. The issue arose again in Hepburn v. Griswold,"
which was argued in 1867 and again in 1868. There were but
eight judges on the bench at the time and the fear of an even division caused some delay in announcing the decision. 62 The Court
finally lined up five to three against the validity of the statute;
but the resignation of Mr. Justice Grier, who had been one of the
majority, took place.before the decision was made public, so the
case was finally disposed of by a four-to-three division of the
judges. On the day on which the Hepburn Case was decided
President Grant nominated Bradley and Strong to vacancies on
the Court ;"' and immediately a movement was set on foot to have
the legal tender issue reopened for argument in cases still pending.
By the aid of the two new justices a rehearing was forced over the
protest of four justices; and in April, 1871, the Court by a
five-to-four division, Bradley and Strong voting with the majority, reversed the decision in Hepburn v. Griswold and sustained
the validity of the Legal Tender Acts. 4 The charge was made
then and has been renewed many times since that President Grant
had deliberately "packed" the Court by the appointment of two
men whose views on the legal tender issue he had ascertained in
advance. Mr. Warren rejects this view and points out that the
decision to nominate Bradley and Strong had been reached before
the president bad any knowledge of how the case of Hepburn v.
Griswold was to be decided. He feels that the fact that the two
60(1863) 1 Wall. (U.S.) 512, 17 L. Ed. 500.

61(1870) 8 Wall. (U.S.) 603, 19 L. Ed. 513.
62
Mr. Warren calls attention to two unreported cases in 1870 in which
statutes were upheld by an evenly divided Court. In the Test Oath Case,
Blair v. Thompson Ridgely, the validity of a Missouri statute denying the
right to vote to persons not taking an oath that they had not participated in
rebellion, was sustained by a four-to-four decision. Another four-to-four
decision upheld the constitutionality of an act of Congress "forbidding suits
against the United States officers who took or destroyed property in the
South as a war measure." Warren, III, 232, and note.
6
The Court had been increased to nine by the act of April 10, 1869.
Warren,
II, 223.
4
6 Knox v. Lee, (1871) 12 Wall. (U.S.) 457, 20 L. Ed. 287.
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judges shared Grant's views on the question proves nothing; for
in the existing state of public opinion on the question the president
could hardly have found two Republicans of Supreme Court
calibre who believed the legal tender legislation to be unconstitutional. 6 Among thoughtful people, however, the Court's blunt
reversal of a decision not fifteen months old under the circumstances described was looked upon with grave concern. Whatever
may have occurred actually, the whole situation had an ugly look.
A most unfortunate precedent had been set. The Court has been
criticized more bitterly on other occasions, but it has probably
never come nearer deserving criticism than in this case.
In spite of its humiliation in the McCardle case, 68 the final victory on the constitutional issue of Reconstruction was to lie with
the Court. There can be no doubt as to what the radical Republican group in Congress was trying to do. 19y the fourteenth and
fifteenth amendments and by the various statutes passed for their
enforcement the protection of civil rights was to be placed directly in the hands of the federal government. That this would have
worked a complete and undesirable revolution in our federal system is certainly true; it seems no less true that such a revolution
was what Congress desired. But by one decision after another
the whole congressional program was emasculated. The process
began in the Slaughterhouse Cases6" in 1875, in which the Court
held that the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States which the fourteenth amendment had forbidden the states
to abridge did not comprise civil rights generally but only such
rights as owed their existence to the national government. It was
practically completed in the Civil Rights Cases"" in 1833, in which
Congress was held to possess no power to protect the negro against
racial discrimination practiced by individuals. Despite the aston85
There could have been no doubt as to Strong's views as to the constitutionality of the Legal Tender Acts since the Pennsylvania supreme
court, of which he was chief justice had upheld their validity in the case
of Shellenberger v. Brinton, (1866) 52 Pa. St. 9. In fifteen states the
supreme courts had upheld the validity of the Legal Tender Acts; while in
two states adverse decisions had been rendered. The cases are cited in
2 Carson, The History of the Supreme Court of the United States, 450,
note. 6
, Supra, p. 290.
67(1873) 16 Wall. (U.S.) 36, 21 L. Ed. 394. As is well known the
Court expressed a view as to the scope of the equal protection of the law
clause of the fourteenth amendment so narrow that it was later obliged to
abandon it. The Slaughter House Cases would probably be decided the
other way today upon the basis of due process of law.
68(109) U. S. 3, 27 L. Ed. 835, 3 S. C. R. 18. Other cases of interest in
this connection are discussed in Warren, III, Chap. 34.
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ishment and chagrin of the Reconstruction leaders these decisions
had the salutary effect of eliminating the negro from national
politics, of putting the responsibility for his protection primarily
upon the states, and of restoring southern confidence in the Court
and the federal government.
E. Nationalism and the Growth of JudicialPower. Even before the bitterness engendered by the war had wholly abated, the
country had become engrossed as never before in industrial and
commercial activity. The issues which came before the Court
ceased in the main to have sectional or partisan implications, and
came more and more to involve economic and social problems.
Only a few of the more conspicuous lines of constitutional development during this later period can be mentioned.
In the first place, there occurred an enormous expansion of
federal authority under the commerce clause of the constitution.
Prior to 1860 only twenty-five cases involving the construction of
this clause had come before the Court; now its docket was crowded with them. Not only did the Court support the extension of
congressional authority over many matters only somewhat indirectly connected with the processes of interstate commerce itself,
but it relentlessly blocked all efforts upon the part of the states
to pass laws which would in any way interfere with or burden
that commerce.
In the second place, there occurred under judicial sanction a
marked increase in the sphere of the implied powers of Congress.
Here may be noted the case of Juillard v. Greeman, 69 holding in
substance that Congress could issue legal tender notes in time of
peace, and suggesting that one basis for that power was the fact
that it was enjoyed by other sovereign governments. Moreover, it
was by boldly resorting to the doctrine of implication that Congress
has been able to build up a genuine police power based on its dele70
gated authority over commerce, taxation, and the post office.
One of the most interesting phases of the Court's work during
this period has been its supervision under the clauses of the fourteenth amendment of the social and economic legislation passed
under the police power of the states. This supervision began only
after a period of judicial uncertainty and experimentation as to
what the fourteenth amendment really meant ;71 but now the valid60(1884) 110 U. S. 421, 28 L. Ed. 204, 4 S. C. R. 122.
70 See the writer's Studies in the Police Power of the National Government 3 MINNESOTA LAW REviEw, 289, 381, 452 and 4 MINNESOTA LAW
REvirw 247, 402.
71The trial and error method by which the Court developed its interpretation of the fourteenth amendment is exceedingly interesting. The
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ity of practically every new exercise of the states' police power
is tested sooner or later before the Supreme Court as to its possible denial of either due process of law or the equal protection of
the law. In one or two cases of this sort the Court has held state
statutes void upon grounds so narrow and legalistic in character
as to merit criticism ;72 but the outstanding feature of the Court's
decisions on the police power has been the broad liberality with
which, in contrast to some of our popularly elected state courts,
it has recognized that genuine social interests must be paramount
over any conflicting interests of the individual. The Court will
prevent legislative invasion of private rights which it regards as
clearly arbitrary; but it has been willing to shift its definition of
the term "arbitrary" to meeting the changing demands of modem
social and economic problems.
The Court was not without its critics during this period, but in
the year 1895 the attacks upon it became particularly virulent as a
result of three decisions rendered that year. In the Sifgar Trust
case7 1 the Court held that the corporations which were monopolizing the manufacture of sugar were not thereby engaged in interstate commerce, and hence were beyond the reach of the Sherman
Act. This seemed to render the federal anti-trust legislation ineffective, and aroused resentment. In the Income Tax cases74 the
Court invalidated the Income Tax Law of 1894 a very popular
statute. Hostility to the Court and its decisioh in this case was
extreme. This was accentuated by the fact that in invalidating a
statute which most people regarded as desirable the Court had to
overrule its earlier decision sustaining the income tax passed during the Civil War, as well as by the further fact that this was a fiveto-f our decision in which Mr. justice Shiras joined the majority after having changed his mind.7 5 The decision was the target for
various phases of it are sketched in the writer's paper. The Social and
Economic Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 20 Mich. L.
Rev.72737.
The most notable instance is the case of Lochner v. New York,
(1905) 198 U. S.45, 49 L. Ed. 937, 25 S. C. R. 539, 3 Ann. Cas. 1133, in
which the New York ten-hour law for bakers was held void. See also
Coppage v. Kansas, (1915) 236 U. S. 1, 59 L. Ed. 441, 35 S.C. R. 240 invalidating a Kansas statute penalizing the discharge of a workman because
of membership
in a labor union.
73United States v. E. C. Knight Co., (1895) 156 U. S.1, 39 L. Ed. 325,
15 S.4C. R. 249.
7 Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., (1895) 158 U. S.601, 39 L.
Ed. 75
1108, 15 S.C. R. 912.
The facts in regard to this are stated by Mr. Warren as follows: "At
its first decision, April 8, 1895, the Court held a tax on real estate income
unconstitutional, unless levied in the manner required for a direct tax; as
to the other income, the Court was evenly divided, Judge Jackson being
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partisan attack during the campaign of 1896, and the agitation
against it culminated in the adoption of the sixteenth amendment
in 1913. The Debs case" aroused the antagonism of organized labor by sustaining the right of the federal courts to issue
injunctions in labor disputes for the protection of federal interests. At no time since 1895 has the Court been as unpopular with
as many people as it was at the time of these decisions.
II

SUMMARIZING OBSERVATIONS.

A. The Supreme Court and its Critics. One of the illuminating facts which Mr. Warren brings out is that the Supreme Court
has been the object of attack during almost its entire history.
There have been one or two brief periods of respite; but in general
it is safe to say that Senator La Follette and his friends in their
recent onslaughts are merely preserving one of the Court's oldest
traditions and are attempting to surround it with that same atmosphere of hostility in which it feels most at home and in which it
has done its best work. There are certain facts about these criticisms and attacks on the Court which are worth noting.
One is impressed at the outset with the cosmopolitan character
of the Court's critics. Every party which has ever been prominent in our political history, with the exception of the Whigs, has
at some time or other strenuously attacked the Court's authority.
That such opposition should be the meat and drink of the Jeffersonian Party as well as of their successors, the Jacksonian Democrats, was perhaps not wholly unnatural in view of the strong
federalism of Marshall's Court; but the judicial enforcement of
the Embargo Acts of 1807 and 1808 brought even the staunch
New England Federalists to an attitude of open defiance of the
Court's decisions. 77 On more than one occasion the southern
Democrats set at naught the decrees of the Court; but their recalcitrant attitude was equalled and surpassed by the Free-soilers
in their resistance to the Fugitive Slave Law decisions; while the
Republican Party not only repudiated the Court's authority in
the Dred Scott case7 8 to say nothing of the Merryman case,79 but
absent owing to illness. A reargument being ordered, a second decision
was made May 20, 1895, in which Judge Jackson (three months before his
death) participated; but owing to the fact that Judge Shiras changed his

mind after the first decision, the Court, by a vote of five to four, held the
whole
7 tax invalid." Warren, III, 421-422.
61n re Debs, (1895) 158 U. S. 564, 39 L. Ed. 1092, 15 S. C. R. 900.
7
"See Mr. Warren's summary of this situation quoted above, p. 281.
rSSupra, p. 285, 287.
79
Supra, p. 289.
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was also guilty in McCardle's Case8" of having directly interfered
for partisan ends with the normal work of the Court. The Democratic Party loudly protested against the Income Tax decision of
1895 ;S1 and the Socialist and other radical parties of more recent
origin have consistently opposed the exercise by the courts of the
82
power of judicial review.
Nor has opposition to the Supreme Court been confined to any
one section of the country. North and South, East and West,
have at various times defied its decrees. Not less than ten states 3
have openly denied its authority, in some instances successfully.,4
When the case of Osborn v. The Bank of the United States"5 came
before the Court for argument in 1824, "seven states were formally in revolt against the national judiciary, and others were hostile ;,8G, and as late as 1859 the legislature of Wisconsin adopted
resolutions declaring that "this assumption of jurisdiction by the
federal judiciary [in the case of Ableman v. Booth 7 ] is an act of
undelegated power, and therefore without authority, void, and of
'' 8

no force."

It is interesting to note, furthermore, the variety of grounds
upon which these violent attacks upon judicial authority have
rested, and how little attention the critics of the Court have paid to
the demands of logical consistency. The Jeffersonians, who came
to regard the doctrine of Marbury v. Madison as anathema, violently assailed the Court for not invalidating the Alien and Sedition
Acts and the act chartering the United States Bank. The Court
was bitterly assailed for its decision in Fletcher v. Peck,0 invali80
8t Supra,
Supra,
82

p. 290.
p. 294. See plank in Democratic Platform of 1896.
Planks advocating the abolition of judicial review of acts of Congress
are found
in the Socialist platforms of 1908, 1912, 1916, and 1920.
83
1 Georgia (1793, 1830-1832); Pennylvania (1807-1809); Ohio (18191821, 1854-1856) ; Kentucky (1821-1825) ; Virginia (1821) ; South Carolina
(1823, 1832) ; New York (1830) ; New Hampshire (1842-1845) ; California
(1854) ; Wisconsin (1854-1859). The resistance in some cases was by the
legislature of states and in some cases by the courts. Documents relating
to most of these controversies are reprinted in Ames, State Documents on
Federal
84 Relations.
This was notably true in the case of the resistance of Georgia to the
decisions of the Court in the Cherokee Indian cases in 1830-1832. Warren,
II, 193-194, 205, 228-229. The resistance of South Carolina to Mr. Justice
Johnson's decision invalidating the state statute prohibiting the entrance
of free neEroes was continuous over a long period of time. Supra, p. 283.
85(1824) 9 Wheat. (U.S.) 738, 6 L. Ed. 204.
8
6Beveridge, op. cit. IV, 384.
87
Supra, p. 287.
88Wis. Gen. Laws 1859, 247-8. See also Ames, State Documents on
Federal Relations 303.
80(1810) 6 Cranch (U.S.) 87, 3 L. Ed. 162.
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dating, as an impairment of the obligation of contracts, a state law
repealing a grant of land; and yet these same critics loudly complained because the Court refused to invalidate the original granting act on the ground that it was passed by fraud and bribery.
The northern states, which openly denied the binding authority of
the decisions upholding the Fugitive Slave Law, were equally
willing to deny the Court's power to invalidate the Missouri Compromise Act of 1820 in the Dred Scott case; while the southern
states, which in like manner belligerently asserted that no federal
court had jurisdiction to invalidate their laws against the importation of free negroes, would have rejoiced to have the Supreme
Court invalidate the Personal Liberty Laws passed in ten northern
states for the purpose of defeating the enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law.90 And so it has gone throughout the Court's
entire history. It has been under fire most of the time, but the
attacks which have been made on it have not been based upon any
common doctrine of opposition to judicial power, carefully
thought out and consistently adhered to. They have been rather
the sporadic protests of parties, of sections, or of interests upon
whose toes the Court has trod in some of its decisions, and whose
temporary resentment has blazed into an opposition to judicial authority in general.
Nor have the Court's critics managed to agree upon what ought
to be done to avert the alleged abuses of judicial power. It is interesting to compare the variety and character of the constructive
proposals which have been made to curb that power. First, it has
been urged at various times that the Court should be "packed" with
judges known to hold certain approved views. The Jeffersonians
seem to have brought about the impeachment of Chase in 1805
with the idea that the procedure could be used as a means of getting rid of the Federalists and filling the Court with Republicans. 91
Many Republicans loudly advocated the "packing" of the Court in
order to bring about the reversal of the Dred Scott case.9 2 For
years it was believed that President Grant had resorted to this
questionable device in order to secure the reversal of the first
9oSuch laws were passed in Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Michigan, Wisconsin, Iowa, and Ohio.
Warren III, 67, note. These laws which refused the assistance of state
officials in the enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law rested on Story's
decision in Prigg v. Pennylvania, (1842) 16 Pet. (U.S.) 539, 10 L. Ed.
1060,91holding the power of Congress over fugitive slaves to be exclusive.
This is made very clear in Beveridge, op. cit. III, Chap. IV dealing
with the
impeachment of Chase.
2
9 Warren, III, 29-32.
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Legal Tender decision ;93 and there is no question but that Congress juggled the size of the Court in 1866 and 1867 in order to
prevent President Johnson from filling vacancies on it with men
who would oppose its views. 4 A second proposal has been made
that the twenty-fifth section of the Federal Judiciary Act should
be repealed, thus taking from the Supreme Court the right to pass
upon the question of constitutionality of state statutes.9 5 Sometimes this proposal has been accompanied by the suggestion that
the Senate should be the court of final authority in all cases involving the validity of state laws. 9 In the third place, it has been
urged that the power of judicial review be abolished entirely,
either leaving Congress and the President the sole judges of their
constitutional powers, or making the Senate the court of last resort.9 7 A multitude of schemes have been worked out to require
either that the Supreme Court must agree unanimously in order
to invalidate a state or federal statute, or else that a certain extraordinary majority of the judges should concur in such a decision. 9s
Finally, it has occasionally been suggested that the Supreme Court
should be made elective for short terms, or appointive for short
terms, in order to make it reflect more accurately the public opinion of the day.9 9 None of the proposals has ever been enacted
into law, and with the exception of the unfortunate lapse in connection with McCardle's Case 00 Congress has possessed self-re9
943Supra, p. 291.
See footnote 58,
95

supra.
- This proposal was not infrequently made during Marshall's struggles
with the various states. Bills to accomplish it were introduced into Congress in 1822 as a protest against the decisions in Cohens v. Virginia, (1821)
6 Wheat. (U.S.) 264, 5 L. Ed. 257, and Green v. Biddle, (1823) 8 Wheat.
(U.S.) 1, 5 L. Ed. 547, (first decided in 1821 and reargued) ; similar bills
were introduced in 1831 during the controversy with Georgia respecting the
Cherokee lands; the same attempt was made in 1858 during the congressional discussion of the Dred Scott case and the Booth case.
9
OIn 1821 Senator Johnson of Kentucky introduced a resolution for a
constitutional amendment providing that in all cases in which a state is a
party, "and in all controversies in which a state may desire to become a
party in consequence of having the constitution or laws of such state questioned, the Senate of the United States shall have appellate jurisdiction."

Warren,
II, 117.
97

Supra, p. 296. See the recent proposal of Senator LaFollette and his
friends.
9
8This problem is somewhat extensively discussed in an article by the
writer, Constitutional Decisions by a Bare Majority of the Court, 19 Mich.
L. Rev.
771.
99
Jefferson favored the appointment of the justices for a six-year term,
and suggested that they be eligible for reappointment if approved by both
houses of Congress. Warren, II, 116. The Socialist and Farmer-Labor
Parties advocate an elective Court.
' 0oSupra, p. 290.
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straint enough to refrain from interfering with the exercise of the
Court's authority.
B. The Supreme Court and Politics. The Supreme Court has
very frequently had to deal with cases which have had definitely
partisan implications. Persons who have been disappointed by its
decisions have sometimes cast reflections upon its impartiality and
have charged it with allowing the political views of its members
to color its administration of justice. In a certain broad sense there
was justice in Jefferson's complaint in 1801 that "the Federalists
have retired into the judiciary as a stronghold... and from that
battery all the works of republicanism are to be beaten down and
erased."''1 1 For as long as the fundamental theories of government continued to form the basis of alignments between political
parties it was of course inevitable that the Court should line up
on one side or the other on those questions. And certainly Mar10 2
shall had no compunctions about taking sides.
But apart from this more general aspect of the case, the history
of the Court is one long refutation of the charge that its decisions
have been rendered for partisan ends or that its judges have been
actuated in their judicial work by motives of political gratitude or
political ambition. There have been men on the bench who have
been politically ambitious, but those ambitions have not colored
the performance of their judicial functions. This salutary tradition has developed in the face of the fact that more than one President has made his appointments to the Court in the hope and
expectation that his own political views would be reflected in its
decisions. Jefferson admittedly did this and urged Madison to
do likewise ;103 but the small success he achieved in molding the
political complexion of the Court is reflected in his gloomy comment on the occasion of Story's appointment in 1810, that "it will
be difficult to find a character of firmness enough to preserve his
independence on the same bench with Marshall,"' 0 4 -a comment
' 0 3Beveridge, op. cit. III, 21.
is interesting speculation to consider what the constitutional development of the country might have been had Jefferson been able to appoint Spencer Roane, the ardent states' right advocate, to the chief justiceship of the Supreme Court in 1801 as he had hoped to do. No two men
held more widely divergent views upon constitutional problems than Marshall and
Roane.
103jefferson, for instance, wrote Madison in 1810, "another circumstance of congratulation is the death of Cushing... which gives an opportunity of closing the reformation [the Republican victory of 1800] by a
successor of unquestionable republican principles." Beveridge, op. cit. IV,
109. 0 4
1 Beveridge, op. cit. IV, 59.
121t
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inspired no doubt by the independent attitude assumed by Mr.
Justice Johnson upon Jefferson's embargo policy. 10 5 It seems
likely that Jackson made his six Supreme Court appointments with
a careful eye to the political views of the new justices as well as to
their fitness; and yet the whole bench decided against him in the
matter of the Spanish land claims." 6 Lincoln showed his freedom
from narrow partisan bias in appointing Mr. Justice Field, a
Democrat, to the Court as well as by giving the chief justiceship
to Chase, who very obviously wanted to replace Lincoln as leader
of his party. And yet in making the latter appointment Lincoln
frankly wrote to a friend that he was influenced by the necessity of
having a chief justice "who will sustain what has been done in regard to emancipation and the legal tender."' 07 It was Chase, however, who helped invalidate the Legal Tender Acts, which as secretary of the treasury, he had urged Congress to pass ;107a and it
was Mr. Justice Davis, appointed by Lincoln and one of his closest
personal friends, who wrote the opinion of the Court in the Miligan case. 08 It is needless to multiply examples of this sort of
judicial independence. Mr. Warren has analyzed the leading decisions upon which a partisan alignment of judges would have
been possible, and finds Republican and Democratic justices indiscriminately joined to make up the majorities and minorities.
"In fact," declares Mr. Warren, "nothing is more striking in
the history of the Court than the manner in which the hopes of
those who expected a judge to follow the political views of the
president who appointed him have been disappointed."'0 9
C. The Personnel of the Court. The present and former members of the Supreme Court do not constitute a very numerous
body of men. Mr. Justice Sanford is the seventy-third justice to
take his seat upon the Bench."10 Twenty-six of these men have
05
In 1808 Mr. Justice Johnson issued a mandamus compelling the
collector of the port of Charlestown to clear a vessel which was being held
under the authority of instructions issued by Jefferson for the enforcement
of the Embargo Act of 1808. Jefferson's order was held illegal and void.
Mr. Warren says: "The episode forms one of the most striking illustrations of judicial independence in American History." Warren, I, 324, et,
seq. 00
' 0 Warren, II, 241-245.
' 7Lincoln added to this statement the comment: "We cannot ask a
man what he will do, and if we should, and he should answer us, we should
despise him for it. Therefore, we must take a man whose opinions are
known." Warren, III, 123.
lO7faHe had. however, assumed this position very reluctantly.
08
109
Supra, p. 289.
Warren, I, 22.
" 0°This figure is reached by counting Rutledge but once. He served for
two brief periods, first as associate justice, and later as chief justice.
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served twenty years or more,"" and eight have served thirty years
or more." 2 After the initial manning of the Court by Washington
it has so far fallen to the lot of only three Presidents, Jackson,
Lincoln, and Taft, to appoint a majority of the justices," 3
although Presidents Grant, Cleveland, Harrison, and Harding (to
date) have each appointed four. The change in the Court's personnel has been greater in recent years than during the period prior to
the Civil War, probably due to the fact that the later appointments
have gone to much older men." 4
Various considerations have entered into the selection of
Supreme Court justices. There has always been a sectional influence arising out of the fact that prior to 1869 the justices were
generally expected to be chosen from the part of the country in
which they did their circuit court duty, one justice being assigned
to each circuit. Even after they were relieved of duty in the circuit courts the tradition of a sectional distribution of members of
the Court has persisted, as is evidenced by some of the recent appointments of President Harding."15 Such a policy limits the
range of choice and may prevent the selection of the men best
fitted for the office. It is but natural that personal friendships and
political affiliations should have actuated many appointments to
the Court. Some men have been selected upon these grounds who
were at the time of their elevation to the bench by no means conspicuous for their learning or judicial experience. Furthermore,
it must not be forgotten that nominations to the Court must be
ratified by the Senate, and the president has on many occasions
been obliged to sacrifice his own desires with reference to the
"'These justices were Cushing, Washington, Marshall, Johnson, Story,
Duval, Thompson, McLean, Wayne, Taney, Catron, Nelson, Grier, Clifford,
Swayne, Miller, Field, Bradley, Harlan, Gray, Fuller, Brewer, White, McKenna, Holmes, Day.
"'These are Justices Washington, Marshall, Johnson, Story, McLean,
Wayne, Field, Harlan.
113Jackson appointed Justices McLean, Baldwin, Wayne, Taney, Barbour and Catron; Lincoln appointed Justices Swayne, Miller, Davis, Field,
and Chase; Taft appointed Justices Lurton, Hughes, Van Devanter, Lamar,
Pitney and elevated Mr. Justice White to the chief-justiceship.
"i4See the interesting article, The Ages of the Justice by Walton H_
Hamilton, The New Republic, Oct. 11, 1922. Mr. Hamilton states that the
average age of all the justices appointed during the first forty years of the
Court's history was forty-seven. No man over sixty was appointed until
1870. In 1921, just before adjournment the average age of the members of
the Court was sixty-nine.
115At present the geographical representation on the Court is as follows: Chief Justice Taft (Connecticut), McKenna (California), Holmes
(Massachusetts), Van Devanter (Wyoming), McReynolds (Tennessee),
Brandeis (Massachusetts), Sutherland (Utah), Butler (Minnesota), Sanford (Tennessee).
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choice of a new justice in order to secure senatorial approval. Although in recent years the president's nominations have with few
exceptions been ratified without much protest, this has by no
means been the rule throughout the history of the Court. There
are twenty cases in which men have been formally named as justices and have failed to receive the approval of the Senate,11 6 the
last instance of such rejection occurring in 1894. And finally the
range of choice of members of the Court has been further narrowed, especially in earlier times, by the unwillingness of some of
the outstanding leaders of the bar to accept positions upon it. The
list of those who have been offered justiceships and have declined
them for various reasons includes such names as those of Patrick
17
Henry, John Quincy Adams, Clay, Seargant, Binney.1
In view of what has been said of the efforts to use the appointments to the Supreme Court for partisan purposes and in view of
the fact that the considerations which have governed those appointments have not infrequently resulted in the selection of men
of not much more than average legal ability, how can we account
for the fact that the Court has to such an astonishing degree
avoided partisanship or political bias and has at the same time
been able to bring to the solution of our great constitutional problems a broad-minded statesmanship of the highest order? The
answer is not to be found alone in the genius of the great leaders
like Marshall or Story, nor in the lofty traditions which the Court
has developed in large measure. The answer is to be found in the
1 16
These cases, with the date of nomination and the name of the President making it in parenthesis, are as follows: John Rutledge (1795, Washington), rejected, 10 to 14; Alexander Wolcott (1811, Madison), rejected,
9 to 24; John J. Crittenden, (1828, J. Q. Adams), Senate, 23 to 17, refuses
to act; Roger B. Taney (1835, nominated as associate justice by Jackson),
indefinite postponement by vote of 24 to 21; John C. Spencer (1844, Tyler),
rejected 21 to 26; Reuben H. Walworth, and Edward King (1844, Tyler),
nomination laid on table; John M. Read (1845, Tyler), Senate adjourns
without action; George W. Woodward (1845, Polk), rejected 20 to 29;
Edward A. Bradford (1852, Fillmore), Senate fails to act before adjournment; George E. Badger and William C. Mlicou (1853, Fillmore), Senate
refuses to act; Jeremiah S. Black (1861, Lincoln) rejected 25 to 26; Henry
Stanberg (1866, Johnson), Senate votes to reduce size of Court to seven to
prevent appointments'by Johnson; Ebenezer R. Hoar (1869, Grant), rejected
24 to 33; George H. Williams (1873, nominated chief justice by Grant),
nomination withdrawn to avoid rejection; Caleb Cushing (1874, nominated
chief justice by Grant), nomination withdrawn to avoid rejection; Stanley
Matthews, (1881, Hayes), not acted upon (appointed by Garfield and confirmed in 1881) ; William B. Hornblower (1893, Cleveland), rejected 24 to
30, through "senatorial courtesy" as a result of the struggle between Cleveland and Senator Hill of New York; Wheeler H. Peckham (1894, Cleveland),
117rejected 32 to 41 for same reasons as Hornblower.
Appointments were also tendered to Levi Lincoln, Martin Van
Buren, Buchanan, and Conkling.
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fact that the holding of high judicial office seems to generate in
the man who holds it, no matter who or what he is, a sense of responsibility, a desire to dispense justice, and an ambition to contribute to the beneficent development of the law, which places him
above partisanship or favoritism and which endows him with a
mental energy and ability of which he may not have dreamed
himself capable.
D. Supreme Court Mores. Attention may be called in closing
to the way in which certain customs or traditions have been
evolved with respect to the work of the Supreme Court and the
activities of its members which have solidified into a sort of customs code of official ethics. In some instances this has come about
as the result of popular criticism and the demand of public opinion;
in other cases it has been due merely to a recognition upon the
part of the Court of what is suitable and proper.
In the first place it looked at the outset as though it might become customary to seek appointments to the Court by direct application. Washington appointed two justices in response to their
own requests,"18 and refused a third. 119 Fortunately, this undignified procedure was soon abandoned and it is safe to say that at
present a man desirous of securing a seat on the Supreme Court
could do nothing more calculated to injure his prospects than to
make any efforts in his own behalf.
In the second place we recognize at present an unwritten law
forbidding a justice of the Supreme Court from engaging in
political activity of any sort, to say nothing of holding political
office. Even the decorous and punctilious behavior of Mr.
Hughes at the time of his nomination to the presidency in 1916
did not fail to elicit charges that he had violated the proprieties by
20
allowing his name to be considered while still on the Bench.
And yet during the early period no such tradition seemed to exist.
Both Jay and Marshall for brief periods held at the same time the
offices of secretary of state and the chief justiceship of the United
States ;121 and Jay, as we have seen, served also as one of the
1"8James Wilson and John Rutledge. Rutledge offered himself to
Washington
to succeed Jay as chief justice in 1795. Warren, I, 33, 127.
"'9 Thomas McKean, chief justice of Pennsylvania, asked for an appointment
in 1789. Warren, I, 40-41.
0
12 Cf. the statement by Chief Justice Waite in 1875 refusing to allow
his name to be considered as a possible presidential candidate. Warren, III,
285-286.
' 2 'Jay had been secretary for foreign affairs under the Confederation,
and continued to act in that capacity until Jefferson's return from France
in the spring of 1790. Washington offered Jay his choice of offices under
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trustees of the national sinking fund.1 22 Both Jay and Ellsworth
while on the Bench were sent on diplomatic missions to foreign
countries.123 Both Jay and Cushing ran for the governorships of
24
their respective states without resigning their judicial positions.
Both Bushrod Washington and Chase electioneered vigorously in
the presidential campaign of 1800.125 Mr. Justice McLean was

either actively or passively a candidate for the presidency in practically every campaign after his appointment by Jackson in 1829,
and openly denied that such a course was in any sense improper. 26
Mr. Justice Davis, without resigning from the Court, accepted the
presidential nomination of the Labor Reform Party in 1872; and
when elected to the United States Senate in January, 1877, continued on the Bench until March 4, of that year. 27 But increasing
resentment has been called forth by each successive instance of
such political activity on the part of Supreme Court justices.
Nor did the members of the Court in the earlier period observe
the salutary custom of refraining from unofficial expressions on
public questions. The abuses which arose out of the early charges
to grand juries in the circuit courts are matters of common knowledge.

2

In 1808 Mr. Justice Johnson issued to the press a long

reply to those who had criticized his decision in the case of Ex
parte Gilchrist.129 Marshall was so aroused by the bitter attacks
upon the Court for its decision in McCulloch v. Maryland that
he published under the nom de guerre "A Friend of the Union"

a series of articles defending his position.3 On several occasions
Mr. Justice McLean expressed himself publicly upon the slavery
issue, and was particularly criticized for giving his views on the
power of Congress over slavery in the territories in 1848, at a time
the new government and Jay chose the chief justiceship. Pellew, John
Jay (Amer. Statesmen's Series) 235-236. Marshall held both offices during the last four weeks of Adams' administration. Beveridge, op. cit. II,
558. 22
' Supra, p. 277.
2
1 SJay was sent to England in 1794 to negotiate the treaty which bears
his name. Ellsworth had been appointed envoy to France in 1799 and never
resumed his duties on the Court. For contemporary criticism of the dual
appointments, see Warren, I, 167.
124Warren, I, 76, 275.
125Bushrod Washington had electioneered for Charles C. Pinkney.
Warren, I, 275. Chase had worked for Adams. Warren, I, 156.
126Warren,
II, 543-544, and note.
1227Warren, III, 287, and note.
' SFor accounts of this interesting practice see Warren, I, 59, 60-61,
165-167.
129Supra. note 105. Johnson's reply is commented on, Warren, I, 334.
' 20 Beveridge, op. cit. IV, 318-323.
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when it was generally understood that that question would ultimately come before the Court for decision. 131
Finally, the Court now exercises every precaution to prevent
the escape of any advance information as to ifs decisions. A
"leak" as to a Supreme Court decision would be regarded as a
most unfortunate and reprehensible occurrence. But Story seems
to have discussed the outcome of pending cases rather freely in his
private correspondence; and other justices of his time and even of
later times did the same.1 32 The correspondence between Buchanan and Justices Catron and Grier with respect to the Dred Scott
case probably did not constitute any very serious deviation from
what the traditions of the Court at that time would have sanctioned. 133 Chief Justice Chase told Boutwell, Grant's secretary of
the treasury, two weeks in advance, how the case of Hepburn v.
Griswold was to be decided." 34 Since that time, however, there
seems to be no conspicuous instance of a breach of the rule of
strict secrecy respecting pending decisions.
These customs and traditions are perhaps not intrinsically of
vital importance. An occasional breach of one or more of them
would probably not interfere with the impartial administration of
justice. They do, however, help the Court to keep itself above
suspicion. They protect its reputation in the eyes of the country.
And therein lies their value and their importance; for, all things
considered, the measure of confidence which people have in the
disinterestedness and integrity of the Supreme Court, is hardly
of less moment than the actual impartiality and efficiency with
which it does its work.
2'Warren, II, 544-546.

"3One is impressed by the freedom with which Story expressed him-

self on any and every question which interested him, a freedom which
would now be regarded as indiscreet and improper. "Life and Letters of
Joseph Story" by William Story, passim.
"3Supra, p. 287.
*a4 Warren, III, 239, note.

